这是一篇读起来很清爽的论文

Li Z, Peng Q. The Dark Side of Executive Compensation Duration: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2019: 1-35.

研究问题是：管理层薪酬制定中的长期导向是否可以抑制short-termism，提高performance

作者利用并购的情境回答这一问题，通过检验 Executive Compensation Duration与M&A performance的关系回答这一问题。从并购频率-并购短期绩效-并购溢价-并购长期绩效-机制检验（通过将Executive Compensation Duration分解为performance-based duration and time-based ）

结论：
1）acquisitions conducted by CEOs with long compensation duration receive more negative announcement returns, and experience significantly worse post-acquisition abnormal operating and stock performance
2）The negative correlation between compensation duration and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) performance is driven by long-term time-vesting plans, not by performance-vesting plans

不足点
1、在内生性问题的解决上，即自选择和遗漏变量，可能存在不足。heckman两阶段法（工具变量：pre-M&A long-run cash volatility、pre-M&A interim industry-level uncertainty ）和工具变量法的工具变量仍可能不满足外生要求。如工具变量方法选用了the median CEO compensation duration from non-industry-clustered peer firms within the same MSA code。选取同一地区同行业非聚集性行业的公司CEO薪酬期限的中位数作为工具变量，但仍然无法排除行业层面的因素会同时影响薪酬设计和并购决策

2、根据描述性统计，COMPENSATION_DURATION中LONG_TERM_NON_EQUITY_DURATION (years) 的均值为0.295 years，应该是不符合horizon

学习点：
为什么选择并购情境解答的原因阐述有借鉴意义
并购长期绩效的检验是DID基础上构建的
the first to distinguish between time-vesting pay duration
and performance-vesting pay duration